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Abstract—Recent studies have considered thwarting false data
injection (FDI) attacks against state estimation in power grids
by proactively perturbing branch susceptances. This approach is
known as moving target defense (MTD). However, despite of the
deployment of MTD, it is still possible for the attacker to launch
stealthy FDI attacks generated with former branch susceptances.
In this paper, we prove that, an MTD has the capability to thwart
all FDI attacks constructed with former branch susceptances
only if (i) the number of branches l in the power system is
not less than twice that of the system states n (i.e., l ≥ 2n,
where n + 1 is the number of buses); (ii) the susceptances of
more than n branches, which cover all buses, are perturbed.
Moreover, we prove that the state variable of a bus that is only
connected by a single branch (no matter it is perturbed or not)
can always be modified by the attacker. Nevertheless, in order
to reduce the attack opportunities of potential attackers, we first
exploit the impact of the susceptance perturbation magnitude on
the dimension of the stealthy attack space, in which the attack
vector is constructed with former branch susceptances. Then,
we propose that, by perturbing an appropriate set of branches,
we can minimize the dimension of the stealthy attack space and
maximize the number of covered buses. Besides, we consider
the increasing operation cost caused by the activation of MTD.
Finally, we conduct extensive simulations to illustrate our findings
with IEEE standard test power systems.
Index Terms—Power grids, cyber-physical system, false data
injection attack, moving target defense, completeness, optimal
protection
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern power grid is becoming more scalable for new
devices, more efficient for productions and smarter for op-
erations. For the purpose to realize intelligent automation
at all operation levels, numerous sensors and meters are
distributed in this large-scale system for wide area monitoring,
protection and control. However, these advanced information
and communication technology (ICT) components make the
power system prone to cyber attacks. It has been proved that
the attacker can tamper with measurements in the field devices
such as the smart meter [2] and the remote terminal unit (RTU)
[3]. With increased connectivity of physical power grids to
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open systems such as the Internet (e.g., convergence between
IT and operation technology or OT), it is imperative to enhance
the security of power grids to keep intruders at bay [4–6].
Traditional supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems for power grids implement basic integrity
and availability checks (e.g., bad data detection or BDD) for
their data, to reject erroneous measurements due to failures or
malicious attacks such as false data injection (FDI). However,
research has shown that carefully designed FDI attacks can
bypass the BDD and remain stealthy, when attackers utilize
comprehensive knowledge of the system topology and branch
susceptances of the power network to guide their actions
[7]. Although stealthy, these FDI attacks [8–12] can be quite
powerful. They may lead to large errors in the estimated sys-
tem states and cause severe consequences such as prolonged
interruption of power supply or equipment damage [13].
Addressing the imminent threats posed by stealthy FDI
attacks, many recent research efforts have sought to charac-
terize their properties and propose countermeasures against
them [14–16]. For example, methods to secure meter mea-
surements and critical state variables against tampering have
been proposed [17] [18]. In practice, however, breach of
the perimeter, including cryptographical safeguards, has been
repeatedly demonstrated in the real world through persistent
attempts by malicious attackers [2, 3, 19, 20]. Besides, since
only partial of the measurements are trusted, this strategy may
reduce the redundancy of the original monitoring system.
Observing that the construction of stealthy FDI attacks de-
pends on the detailed knowledge of the power grid’s configu-
ration, an alternative defense approach is to change the system
parameters by design for defeating the knowledgeable attacker.
Existing work has typically implemented such moving target
defense (MTD) [21] by proactively perturbing the impedance
of certain branches of a power network using the distributed
flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices, e.g., DSI
and DSSC [22]. By modifying D-FACTS, the changes of
branch parameters are unpredictable to attackers, thus, increas-
ing uncertainties for them to execute stealthy FDI attacks on
the power system, which complies with the definition of MTD.
Prior works on MTD against stealthy FDI attacks have
demonstrated success in defeating knowledgeable attackers.
Morrow et al. [23] and Davis et al. [24] investigated the
divergence of the system state due to bad/malicious data,
by comparing expected results caused by branch impedance
perturbations with actual observed responses of the system.
Rahman et al. [21] presented the formal design of an MTD
application, and show by simulations that arbitrary branch
susceptance perturbations may not be effective in detecting
FDI attacks. Tian et al. [25] proposed a notion of hidden
MTD, which aims to make the defense stealthy to attackers.
Liu et al. [26] extended the hidden MTD to the AC distribution
system, and remarkably, considered the minimization of power
losses and power flow differences before and after MTD.
Lakshminarayana and Yau [27] presented analytical conditions
for MTD to be truly effective, and presented an explicit
cost-benefit analyis of the MTD, which can be viewed as a
2form of insurance. Liu et al. [28] considered the utility of
MTD as an optimized goal, and solved a joint optimization
problem with the generation cost loss. Although the authors
in [25, 27, 28] have analyzed MTD’s capability to thwart
FDI attacks constructed with former branch parameters, they
haven’t given insight about the effectiveness of MTD and
presented limitations of MTD related to both the power
network structure and perturbed branches. Besides, the impact
of the perturbation magnitude on the stealthy FDI attack space
after MTD is not thoroughly investigated.
In fact, for understanding the impacts of the deployment of
D-FACTS devices on the power system, pioneer works have
devoted to studying the linear sensitivities of power system
quantities such as voltage and power losses with respect
to the branch impedance perturbation [29–31]. For example,
Rogers and Overbye [29] analyzed the linear sensitivities with
respect to branch impedance for solving the real power loss
minimization and voltage control problems. They showed that,
by perturbing the branch impedances of 5 branches within
the range +/- 20% of their original values in the IEEE 14-
bus power system with D-FACTS devices, the power loss is
3.35 MW compared to 3.51 MW without any perturbation.
Significantly, Morrow et al. [23] investigated the impacts of the
use of D-FACTS on the power losses and voltages considering
the defense effect of branch perturbations. They proved that if
the perturbations are within 20% of the impedance in the IEEE
14-bus power system, then there are nearly 10,000 perturbation
cases that can restrict the power losses within 1%. That is,
the operating points after branch perturbations are limited to
the small neighborhood around the optimum operation points.
Other power systems were also tested. The results highlight
the practicality of modifying D-FACTS to provide MTD in
power grid.
In this paper, we focus on analyzing the completeness,
deployment and the increasing operation cost of MTD in
terms of thwarting FDI attacks constructed with old system
information. Similar to prior studies [21, 25, 27, 28], we
mainly consider FDI attacks of the form a = Hc [7] with
the DC power flow model. To begin with, we define a
stealthy attack space as the intersection of the set of attack
vectors generated with the former branch susceptances and
the set of attack vectors generated with the current branch
susceptances after MTD. Once an MTD is able to reduce the
dimension of the stealthy attack space to 0, it is defined as
a complete MTD. Based on these definitions, we analyze the
conditions required for a complete MTD from the aspect of
inherent power network structure and the branches that are
perturbed. Besides, limitations for a power system to satisfy
these conditions are also exploited. Further, for the case when
the necessary conditions for a complete MTD are not met, we
investigate methods to narrow down the attack opportunities
of potential attackers by properly selecting a set of target-
perturbation branches1. Moreover, we discuss the reduction of
the additional operation cost caused by the activation of MTD.
It should be clarified that some results have been presented
in our conference paper [1], in which we have analyzed the
topology limitation for achieving a complete MTD and the
impacts of the perturbation magnitude on the reduction of
the stealthy attack space. While in this journal version, more
issues are discussed, including the special power network
structure with which we can never achieve complete MTD, the
impacts of the perturbation magnitude on the change (increase,
invariant and decrease) of the dimension of the stealthy attack
space, the optimal deployment of D-FACTS devices and the
1The target-perturbation branch means that the susceptance of the branch
will be perturbed.
additional operation cost caused by MTD. We also present
more simulations to illustrate and demonstrate our findings.
In summary, the contributions are as follows:
• First, we prove that an MTD is complete only if (i) the
number of branches l is larger than or equal to twice
that of the system states n (i.e., l ≥ 2n, where n+ 1 is
the number of system buses), and (ii) the susceptances
of more than n branches, which cover all buses, are
perturbed. Besides, we prove that we can never realize a
complete MTD if the power network contains a bus that
is only connected by a single branch. The state variable
of this bus can be injected arbitrary bias by the attacker.
• Moreover, we observe that, the change of the perturbation
magnitude almost does not affect the dimension of the
stealthy attack space. Based on this result, we propose an
algorithm to compute a feasible set of target-perturbation
branches that can minimize the dimension of the stealthy
attack space and maximize the number of covered buses.
Besides, we discuss the increase of the operation cost
after MTD considering the security constraint, which is
associated with the susceptance perturbation magnitude.
• Finally, we illustrate and demonstrate our results by
conducting extensive simulations with the IEEE standard
power systems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We
introduce the system model and threat model in Section II-A.
The problem statement is addressed in Section III. In Section
IV, we analyze the MTD in terms of thwarting FDI attacks.
We present simulation results of our findings in Section V.
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND THREAT MODEL
Throughout this paper, calligraphy font (L) indicates a set
or a subspace (A), math boldface font (H) indicates a matrix,
bold lower case letter (x) indicates an vector. S(·) denotes the
(column) span of a matrix. R(·) is the rank of a matrix. ·T
indicates the transpose of a matrix. All proofs in this paper
are included in the Appendix. |·| denotes the cardinality of a
set.
A. System model
To avoid intensive computation and obtain an optimal solu-
tion for large power systems, power system engineers usually
utilize a linearized DC power flow model to approximate the
AC power flow model [32][33]. For its computational speed
and simplicity, the DC model has been widely used for decades
in both industry and academia [55–58]. Although it is less
accurate, the DC model is more robust and often used in real-
time operations such as the computation of marginal price
[36]. In the DC model, the voltage magnitude is by default
set as 1 p.u.. The state variables are reduced to the voltage
phase angle. The measurements are reduced to active power
flows. Moreover, since the phase angle difference is usually
constrained to be small, the power flow equations can be
reduced to
fij = −bij(θi − θj), pi =
∑
j∈Ki
fij , (1)
where fij indicates the active power flow between bus i and
bus j, bij is the equivalent susceptance on branch {i, j}, θi
and θj are respectively the voltage phase angle of bus i and
j, pi is the active power injection of bus i, Ki is a set of
neighboring buses connected to bus i.
We consider a classic power transmission network con-
sisting of a set N = {1, 2, · · · , n + 1} of buses and a set
3L = {k1, k2, · · · , kl} of branches, where n+1 is the number
of buses and l is the number of branches. With the DC model,
by setting an arbitrary bus as the reference/slack bus, the
remaining n phase angles θ1, θ2, · · · , θn are taken to form
the system states, typically denoted as x ∈ Rn. Each branch
kt = {i, j} ∈ L connects two buses i and j. Assuming that the
power system is fully measured, i.e., each bus is monitored by
one meter and each branch is monitored by two meters (both
in the positive and negative direction). Then, the number of
meter measurements is m = 2l + n + 1. The DC model can
be derived as
z = Hx+ η. (2)
where H is termed as the measurement matrix, z denotes the
measurements of active power injections and active power
flows, η represents the independent measurement noises,
which are typically assumed to be normally distributed [i.e.,
ηi ∼ N (0, σ2i )].
Construction of the measurement matrix. Let A denote
the branch-bus incidence matrix. It is given by
ati =


1, if branch kt starts from bus i;
−1, if branch kt ends at bus i;
0, otherwise,
(3)
where ati is the element in the position (t, i) of the matrix
A. Let D denote the diagonal branch susceptance matrix. Its
diagonal element Dtt is −bij with branch kt = {i, j}. Thus,
the invertible symmetric admittance matrix is B = ATDA
and the branch-bus shift factor matrix is S = DA. Considering
the DC power flow equations, we have f = Sθ and p =
Bθ, where f denotes the active power flows, p denotes the
power injections, θ denotes the phase angles. Therefore, the
measurement matrix H ∈ Rm×n can be derived as
H =


B
S
−S

 =


ATDA
DA
−DA

 , (4)
We can see that the measurement matrix H ∈ Rm×n is a
function of the system topology and branch susceptances.
In cases that the power systems are partially measured
(i.e., some buses and branches are not monitored by meters),
the corresponding measurement matrix is formed by selecting
some rows from the measurement matrix of the fully measured
case. For any measurement matrix, we assume that m > n
in this paper. Note that all results in this paper are satisfied
whenever the system is fully measured or partially measured.
State estimation (SE). State estimator, a fundamental tool
for economically and dynamically routing power flows, is
responsible to optimally estimate the state variables with noisy
measurements collected by the underlying SCADA system
[32]. The most common and concise mathematical description
of SE is
xˆ = (HTWH)−1HTWz = Kz, (5)
whereW is a diagonal matrix whose elements are reciprocals
of the noise variances,K is referred to as the “pseudo-inverse”
of H because KH = I. xˆ is calculated by using certain
statistical estimation criterions such as maximum likelihood,
weighted least-squares and etc.
Bad data detection (BDD). Normally, in order to filter
out abnormal/erronuous meter measurements, the bad data
detection (BDD) checker is used in SE. Let r = z − Hxˆ =
(I −HK)z be the residues between the measurements z and
their estimates zˆ = Hxˆ. BDD compares the Euclidean norm
‖r‖2 with a predetermined threshold τ . If ‖r‖2 > τ , the
abnormal alarm is triggered; otherwise, the measurements z
are considered normal.
In the following, we assume that the measurements are
noiseless (i.e., e = 0) to simplify the discussions. Under this
assumption, the DC model can be written as z = Hx. The cor-
responding state estimates are given by xˆ = (HTH)−1HT z =
x. Moreover, the threshold τ for the BDD is equal to 0.
Nevertheless, the main results in the following derivations
still keep valid with noisy measurements. In our simulations
(see Section V), we will evaluate the impacts of measurement
noises.
B. Threat model
As a critical infrastructure, the security issue of power
grid has attracted a lot of attention. For example, US Na-
tional Electric Sector Cybersecurity Organization Resource
(NESCOR) records safety incidents and negative impacts on
the physical objects in power systems [34]. North American
Electrical Reliability Council (NERC) reports lessons learned
from failures and blackouts caused by cyber system faults [35].
These recordings show the security risks of power systems,
which should be well addressed during daily maintenance and
operation.
Adversarial setting. In this paper, we consider the class of
stealthy FDI attacks studied in [7]. Let a ∈ Rm be the attack
vector. The malicious measurements are given by za = z+ a.
It has been proved that za cannot be detected by the BDD if
a = Hc [7], where c ∈ Rn is an arbitrary vector. That is, ra =
za−Hxˆa = z+a−H(xˆ+c) = z−Hxˆ = r, where ra denotes
the measurement residues after the FDI attack and xˆ
a
denotes
the modified states. We can see that the measurement residues
are not changed after the FDI attack. Thus, the bad data alarm
is not triggered while the system states are subverted.
In other words, let A ∈ Rm be a subspace that contains all
FDI attacks with the form of a = Hc. Then, A is given by
A = {a | a = Hc, c ∈ Rn}. (6)
We can see that A is equal to the subspace S(H), where S(·)
denotes the (column) span of a matrix. Therefore, if a ∈ S(H)
holds, then the malicious measurements za can bypass the
BDD. In this paper, we assume the attacker has the following
capabilities:
• The attacker is able to know a measurement matrix H
based on his/her understanding, e.g., through topology-
leaking attacks [37] or subspace attacks [38]. Since these
topology attacks depend on historical measurements, the
measurement matrix H cannot be learned by the attacker
immediately. The learning/inferring process usually takes
a sufficiently long time (hours or days) due to the exfil-
tration of an enough amount of historical measurement
data [27, 38–41].
• The attacker is able to eavesdrop and tamper with the
measurements by intruding into the communication net-
work or IP-accessible field devices [42]. Practically, the
attacker will have limited resources to compromise all the
measurements [7]. However, we do not assume a priori
what specific data can be compromised or not. Note also
that although the attacker might be able to compromise
the confidentiality of the raw data points, he/she will need
non-trivial efforts and time to learn their higher system
level relationships to guide his attack.
• The attacker is unable to take over (or have full access
to) the control center or the SCADA systems. Once the
attacker can exploit the control center or the SCADA sys-
tems, he/she is powerful enough to thwart most defensive
mechanisms.
4III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Based on the system model and threat model, in this section,
we first introduce the approach of MTD used in power grid.
Then, we present the problems mainly investigated in this
paper.
A. Moving target defense by perturbing branch susceptances
D-FACTS. The distributed flexible AC transmission system
(D-FACTS) devices are first introduced by Divan and Johal
[22] for controlling the power flow. These devices can alter
the impedances of power lines, and thus, control power
flows to eliminate transmission constraints and bottlenecks.
They are small and light enough to be suspended from the
power line, floating both electrically and mechanically on it.
Moreover, the equipped communication system enables them
to receive control commands and transmit working states to
remote control stations [43]. To date, a lot of researches have
devoted to analyzing the performance of D-FACTS devices
and investigating the use of them in different power system
applications [29, 30, 44–46].
MTD. Recently, some pioneer works have exploited the
adoption of D-FACTS devices for thwarting FDI attacks in
power grid [21, 23–25, 27, 47–49]. Morrow et al. [23] [24]
were the first researchers who proposed to perturb branch
impedances for probing both the malicious and bad data in
the power grid. The following works [21, 25, 27] named this
branch perturbation strategy as moving target defense (MTD).
Here we briefly introduce this defensive mechanism based on
the DC model.
With D-FACTS devices, the defender is able to actively
perturb a set of branch susceptances, an thus, increase system
uncertainty for potential attackers. Supposing the susceptance
of branch kt = {i, j} is perturbed, then we have
bij → b
′
ij , (7)
where b′ij is the susceptance of branch kt after MTD. Actually,
we cannot change bij as much as we can [23, 25, 29]. There
are limits on the perturbed result, i.e.,
bminij ≤ b
′
ij ≤ b
max
ij . (8)
As a result, the measurement matrix is changed. We assume
that the control commands of MTD can be protected in the
control center and transmitted through safeguarded commu-
nication channels. Thus, the attacker is unable to anticipate
them. We use H′ to denote the new measurement matrix after
MTD. In fact, the attacker might try to learn the perturbed
measurement matrixH′. But the learning process usually takes
a sufficiently long time (hours or days) due to the exfiltration
of an enough amount of historical measurement data [27, 38–
41]. In other words, the attacker cannot obtain the latest
measurement matrix immediately. Thus, we can dynamically
change the measurement matrix accordingly before it risks be-
ing exposed. The execution cycle of MTD has been discussed
by authors in [25] and [27].
Since the current susceptance perturbations are not antic-
ipated by the attacker, he/she only knows the former mea-
surement matrix H (may not be the measurement matrix just
before MTD). Thus, if the attacker still constructs the attack
vector as a = Hc, it is possible that a /∈ S(H′) after MTD. In
other words, the malicious measurements za = z
′ +Hc may
not bypass the BDD with H′, where z′ are the measurements
after MTD. The defender’s BDD after MTD is given by
r(z′) = ‖z′ −H′K′z′‖, (9)
whereK′ = (H′
T
H′)−1H′
T
. Sincem > n, we can prove that
H′K′ 6= I. Therefore, r(z′) = 0 if and only if z′ ∈ S(H′)
with noiseless measurements [7]. Since z′ ∈ S(H′), r(za) = 0
if and only if a ∈ S(H′). This means that attack vector can
bypass the BDD after MTD if and only if it belongs to the
following stealthy attack space.
Definition 3.1: Let As denote the stealthy attack space.
Then, As = S(H) ∩ S(H′), i.e.,
As = {a | a = Hc ∧ a = H
′c′, c, c′ ∈ Rn}. (10)
We can see that the stealthy attack space is the intersection of
the column space of H and H′. Therefore, the stealthy attack
space is also a subspace and its dimension is given by
dim(As)
= dim(S(H) ∩ S(H′))
= dim(S(H)) + dim(S(H′))− dim
(
S(H) ∪ S(H′)
)
= 2n−R([H H′]),
(11)
where dim(·) is the dimension of a subspace, R(·) is the rank
of a matrix. We can see that the dimension of the stealthy
attack space As is closely related to the rank of the combined
matrix [H H′], i.e., R([H H′]). We define R([H H′]) as the
security factor of MTD and denote it as γ.
B. Problem statement
In this paper, we mainly analyze the effectiveness of MTD
from two aspects: first, the capability of MTD to protect
the system from any FDI attack constructed with the former
measurement matrix; second, if the first capability cannot
be achieved, the capability of MTD to narrow the attack
opportunities of potential attackers by appropriately deploying
the D-FACTS devices and setting the susceptance perturbation
magnitudes.
As we know, as long as the stealthy attack space As is not
{0}, it is still possible for the attacker to successfully execute
FDI attacks after MTD. The intuitive understanding is that, if
∃ c, c′ ∈ Rn satisfying a = Hc = H′c′ 6= 0 [i.e., a ∈ S(H)∩
S(H′)], then the malicious measurements za = z
′ + a after
MTD can circumvent the defender’s BDD. We take the 4-bus
power system (Fig. 1) as an example. Suppose that the branch
susceptances known by the attacker are b12 = −1, b13 = −2,
b14 = −3, b23 = −4 and b34 = −5. If we perturb the branches
{1, 2} and {2, 3} as ∆b12 = 0.1 and ∆b13 = 0.2, the attacker
still can construct an attack vector as a = [0, 0, 3c, 0, 5c]T to
bypass the BDD after MTD, where c ∈ R is the error injected
into the state variable of bus 4. Here the dimension of the
stealthy attack space is 1. In other words, the MTD may not
be complete to thwart all FDI attacks with the form of a = Hc.
We define the MTD’s completeness as follows:
Definition 3.2: An MTD is said to be complete if and only
if all attack vectors in A except the zero vector cannot bypass
the BDD after MTD. This indicates that As = {0}.
Besides, once a complete MTD cannot be achieved, we need
to exploit how to reduce the stealthy attack space as much as
possible, thus, reducing the probability of stealthy FDI attacks
after MTD. An intuitive idea is to perturb all branches in the
power network. But it is an unrealistic assumption to deploy
D-FACTS on all branches. On the other hand, we cannot
randomly choose a set of target-perturbation branches and
arbitrarily perturbed them. The impacts on the stealthy attack
space might be different if we perturb different branches and
set different perturbation values. For example, given the 4-bus
power system shown in Fig. 1, Table I shows the change of
the dimension of the attack space when we perturb different
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Fig. 1: A 4-bus power sys-
tem with 5 branches.
Stealthy attack space
0
Fig. 2: An illustration example about the change of the stealthy attack
space As with the security factor γ.
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3 4
Fig. 3: A 4-bus power sys-
tem with 6 branches.
branches and set different perturbation values. From row 1 and
row 2, we can see that the dimensions of the stealthy attack
space are different when we perturb different branches. Form
row 3 and row 4, we can see that the dimensions of the stealthy
attack space are different when we perturb branch {3, 4} to
different values.
TABLE I: The dimension of the stealthy attack space after
MTD
Branch Perturbations dim(As)
∆b12 = 0.1,∆b13 = 0.1 1
∆b12 = 0.1,∆b23 = 0.1 2
∆b13 = 0.1,∆b14 = 0.3,∆b34 = 0.5 2
∆b13 = 0.1,∆b14 = 0.3,∆b34 = 0.2 1
Moreover, due to the physical limitation of D-FACTS
devices [30] and their induced operation costs [25, 27], the
branch susceptance cannot be perturbed to any value. There-
fore, a natural question emerges that, given a set of D-FACTS
devices, how do they affect the stealthy attack space and the
operation cost when we deploy them on different branches and
set them with different values? This is a critical issue for us
to carry out MTD.
IV. ANALYSIS OF MTD TO THWART FDI ATTACKS
In this section, first, we analyze the detection of FDI attacks
constructed with the former measurement matrix using MTD.
Second, we analyze the completeness of MTD and discuss
physical limitations of the power network to achieve this
property. Third, we investigate the impact of the susceptance
perturbation magnitude on the dimension of the stealthy attack
space. Lastly, we provide guidance on effective MTD for mini-
mizing the dimension of the stealthy attack space, maximizing
the number of covered buses, and reducing the operation cost.
A. Detecting FDI attacks with MTD
First of all, we discuss the detection of FDI attacks con-
structed with the former measurement matrix.
After MTD, from the measurement matrix H, we select u
columns which form a submatrix Hu such that Hu can be
linearly represented by H′. The rest v (v = n − u) columns
in H form a submatrix Hv, i.e., H = [Hu Hv]. Assume
that the attacker constructs an attack vector as a = Hc with
the purpose to bypass the BDD after MTD. Actually, a =
Hucu +H
vcv, where cu ∈ R
u and cv ∈ R
v . Then, we have
the following conclusion.
Proposition 4.1: The BDD after MTD can detect the attack
vector a = Hc only if cv 6= 0v , where 0v is a v-dimension
zero vector.
Proof. Please see Appendix A.
Proposition 4.1 presents a necessary condition for the detec-
tion of FDI attacks constructed with the former measurement
matrix. It also indicates the soundness of MTD. That is, if the
BDD after MTD can detect the attack vector a, then at least
one of the state variables in cv is modified. With this condition,
if Hv cannot be linearly represented by H′, then there might
not exist c′ ∈ Rn such that Hvcv = H′c′ for an arbitrarily
selected cv. Thus, at most v state variables corresponding to
cv cannot be independently modified by the attacker. Since
v ≥ n − dim(As), if the dimension of the stealthy attack
space dim(As) is smaller, the more state variables cannot
be independently modified by the attacker after MTD. How-
ever, note that the attackers cannot anticipate/predict the new
measurement matrix H′, the “blind” attacker might try his/her
luck to execute FDI attacks, and thus, increase the detection
probability of these attacks with the BDD after MTD.
Specifically, to illustrate the effectiveness of MTD for
thwarting FDI attacks, we give an illustration example (Fig. 2)
about the change of the stealthy attack space with respect to the
security factor γ. We can see that, the stealthy attack space is
equal to the column space ofH andH′ [S(H) = S(H′)] when
the security factor γ is n; the stealthy attack space is the in-
tersection of the column space of H and H′ [S(H) 6= S(H′)]
when the security factor γ is between n and 2n; the stealthy
attack space is {0} when the security factor γ is 2n. Therefore,
if the security factor γ is smaller, the “volume” of the stealthy
attack space is smaller. A smaller stealthy attack space means a
smaller probability of stealthy FDI attacks constructed with the
former measurement matrix. In other words, after MTD, there
are less successful opportunities for the attacker to execute
stealthy FDI attacks with the old system information. Thus,
we claim that MTD is more effective to thwart stealthy FDI
attacks. For example, when γ = 2n, after MTD, no attack
vector a = Hc can bypass BDD, which means that the
probability of stealthy FDI attacks constructed with the former
measurement matrix is zero. We will evaluate the effectiveness
of MTD with respect to the dimension of the stealthy attack
space in Section V-A2.
Considering the 4-bus power system shown in Fig. 3, the
branch susceptances known by the attacker are b12 = −1,
b13 = −2, b14 = −3, b23 = −4, b24 = −5 and b34 = −6. If
we do not perturb any branches, then all attack vectors a = Hc
can bypass the BDD (i.e., γ = n = 3, dim(As) = 3); If we
perturb the susceptance of branch {1, 2} to b′12 = −1.1, then
we can reduce the dimension of the stealthy attack space to 2
(i.e., 3 < γ = 4 < 6, dim(As) = 2), but there still exist attack
vector a = Hc that can bypass the BDD after MTD, e.g.,
c = [0, c2, c3]
T , c2, c3 ∈ R; If we perturb the susceptances
of branches {1, 2}, {1, 3} and {2, 4} as b′12 = −1.1, b
′
13 =
−2.15, b′24 = −5.1, then any FDI attack constructed as a =
Hc (a 6= 0) cannot bypass the BDD after MTD (i.e., γ =
2n = 6, dim(As) = 0). That is, this MTD is complete. We
find that we can realize a complete MTD only if more than
3 branches are perturbed under this 4-bus power system with
6 branches. The completeness of MTD is investigated in the
next subsection.
6B. Analysis of MTD’s completeness
Here we first give a sufficient and necessary condition for
achieving a complete MTD mathematically. Then, we present
physical constraints for achieving this property.
1) Mathematical analysis: In fact, an MTD is not complete
because the BDD after MTD misses detecting some FDI
attacks, i.e., As 6= {0}. According to the Definition 3.2, to
achieve a complete MTD, we need to make As = {0}. Since
the subspace spanned by the zero vector has zero dimension,
the dimension of As is zero if an MTD is complete. Thus, we
have the following conclusion.
Proposition 4.2: An MTD is complete if and only if the
security factor γ = 2n.
Proof. Please see Appendix B.
Proposition 4.2 presents a sufficient and necessary condition
for achieving a complete MTD mathematically. Note that if
γ = R([H H′]) = 2n, the intersection of S(H) and S(H′) is
{0}. Thus, all FDI attacks constructed as a = Hc (a 6= 0) can
be detected by the BDD after MTD.
Remark 4.1: Moreover, if an MTD is complete, then we
can identify the attack vector constructed with the former
measurement matrix. Suppose the attack vector is a = Hc.
Then, the malicious measurements are za = H
′x′ + Hc =
[H′ H][x′ c]T , where x′ denotes the state variables without FDI
attacks. Since the combined matrix [H′ H] has full column
rank, we can uniquely solve the variables c with the malicious
measurements. Thus, we can identify the injected errors of the
state variables.
2) Physical limitations: Essentially, whether we can con-
struct a complete MTD or not depends on the structure of the
power network and the perturbed branches. Considering the
fully measured case, the measurement matrix before and after
MTD are
H =


ATDA
DA
−DA

 H′ =


ATD′A
D′A
−D′A

 . (12)
The combined matrix of H and H′ can be written as C =
[H H′]. Let S˜ =
[
S S′
]
=
[
DA D′A
]
, we have
C =


AT S˜
S˜
−S˜

 =


AT 0n×l 0n×l
0l×l Il×l 0l×l
0l×l 0l×l −Il×l




S˜
S˜
S˜

 , (13)
where 0n×l is an n by l zero matrix, Il×l is an l by l identity
matrix. Therefore, we can derive that R(C) ≤ R(S˜). Since S˜
is an l by 2n matrix, we have R(S˜) ≤ min{l, 2n}. Therefore,
only if l ≥ 2n can we make R(C) = 2n. In other words, in
order to make the security factor γ = R(C) = 2n, the number
of branches of the power transmission system must be larger
than or equal to 2n. We observe that this condition must be
satisfied under the other measured cases (i.e., the system is
not necessarily fully measured) as well.
Theorem 4.3: An MTD is complete only if the following two
conditions are satisfied:
• l ≥ 2n, where l is the number of branches and n+ 1 is
the number of buses in the power system;
• The perturbed branches must cover all buses;
Proof. Please see Appendix C.
Theorem 4.3 provides a necessary condition for realizing
a complete MTD. That is, the completeness of MTD can
be achieved only if the system topology and the perturbed
branches meet certain requirements. Besides, we can derive
another two points from the second condition. First, to cover
all buses, at least n branches should be perturbed. Second,
once a bus is not covered by the perturbed branches, the
state variable of this bus can be modified stealthily if the
attacker happens to attack it only. That is, let a = Hc be
an attack vector. Then, if ci = 0 (ci ∈ c) for any i ∈ Mmtd,
then the malicious measurements za = z
′ + a can bypass the
BDD after MTD, where Mmtd is a non-empty set of buses
that are covered by the perturbed branches. Thus, ci 6= 0
(i /∈ Mmtd) can be any values. This indicates that the attacker
can arbitrarily modify the state variables of buses that are not
covered by the perturbed branches. Therefore, for a complete
MTD, we need to ensure that: (i) the power transmission
system has more than 2n branches; (ii) more than n branches
are perturbed; (iii) the perturbed branches cover all buses. For
example, the 4-bus power system shown in Fig. 3 can support
the realization of a complete MTD, because it has 6 branches
(2n = 2 ∗ 3 = 6), while the 4-bus power system with 5
branches shown in Fig. 1 cannot. If any one of the above three
conditions is not satisfied, we cannot make an MTD complete.
Considering the first condition, if the power system has less
than 2n branches, then the dimension of the stealthy attack
space satisfies
dim(As) = 2n−R([H H
′]) ≥ 2n−R(S˜) ≥ 2n− l. (14)
That is, the smallest dimension of the stealthy attack space
after MTD is larger than or equal to 2n− l.
Remark 4.2: According to the aforementioned analysis, we
find that is difficult to realize a complete MTD. For a complete
MTD, the power transmission system must have at least 2n
branches (i.e., l ≥ 2n), and more than n branches, which
cover all buses, should be perturbed. These conditions may
not be held in practice. Particularly, we examine the number
of branches in the IEEE test power systems provided in
MATPOWER [50]; only three of all 41 cases have more than
2n branches, namely case6ww (11 branches), case89pegase
(210 branches) and case145 (453 branches). What’s more, we
discover that we can never make an MTD complete if the the
power transmission system has a bus that is only connected
by a single branch.
Theorem 4.4: It is impossible to make an MTD complete
if the power transmission system contains a bus that is only
connected by a single branch.
Proof. Please see Appendix D.
This special case of the power network structure limits the
realization of a complete MTD. Besides, we find that the state
variable of the bus that is only connected by a single branch
can be arbitrarily modified by the attacker. Let t be the bus that
is only connected by a single branch. Then, for any ct ∈ R,
there exists c′t ∈ R such that htct = h
′
tc
′
t, where ht and h
′
t are
respective the tth column of the matrix H and H′. Therefore,
if the attack vector is a = htct, then a ∈ S(H
′) always
holds, which can definitely bypass the BDD after MTD. We
present a simple example to illustrate that. In the 4-bus power
system shown in Fig. 4(a), the state variable of bus 3 can be
arbitrarily modified because it is only connected by branch
{2, 3}. Therefore, as long as the system contains a bus that
is only connected by a single branch, we can never realize a
complete MTD.
3) Discussion: Nevertheless, it might not be necessary to
achieve a complete MTD in some power systems. We take
the 3-bus power system shown in Fig. 4(b) as an example.
Even though we cannot realize a complete MTD because it
only has 3 branches, which is less than 2 ∗ 2 = 4, we can
protect all state variables from being arbitrarily modified by
the attacker when we perturb the branches {1, 2} and {2, 3}.
Suppose the perturbations are ∆b12 and ∆b23, and the attack
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Fig. 4: (a) A 4-bus power system with 4 branches; (b) A 3-bus
power system.
vector is a = Hc, where c = [c1 c2]
T . If this attack can bypass
the BDD after MTD, c1 and c2 must satisfy
c2
c1
=
b12∆b23 − b23∆b12
b12∆b23 +∆b12∆b23
. (15)
Therefore, the attacker must know the susceptance perturba-
tions ∆b12 and ∆b23 to construct a coordinated attack vector
a. We can see that is almost impossible for the attacker to
construct such an attack vector. Definitely, a complete MTD
can thwart any attack vector a = Hc when H is very different
from the measurement matrix H′ after MTD. But it might not
be a necessary condition for some power systems.
C. Impact of the susceptance perturbation magnitude on the
dimension of the stealthy attack space
A practical and effective way to enhance the security of
the power system is to reduce the stealthy attack space As
and cover as many buses as possible with MTD, thus reduc-
ing the attack opportunities of potential attackers. We start
by investigating the impact of the susceptance perturbation
magnitude on the dimension of the stealthy attack space when
one more branch susceptance is perturbed. Since the security
factor γ [i.e., R([H H′])] determines dim(As), we focus on
the change of γ in the following. As H′ = H+∆H, based on
the sparse property of ∆H, we first present three cases about
the change of γ when one more branch is perturbed. Second,
we investigate the impact of the susceptance perturbation
magnitude on the value of γ with these three cases.
Before go deeper into the analysis, we prove that ∆H has
a sparse structure.
Proposition 4.5: Suppose Ld is a set of perturbed branches.
∆H is a sparse matrix with non-zero elements in the idth and
jdth columns, with kd = {id, jd} ∈ Ld.
Proof. Please see Appendix E.
Based on the sparse structure of the matrix ∆H, we can
draw a conclusion about the changing range of γ when one
more branch is perturbed. Let C = [H H′] and C′ = [H H′′]
be the combined matrices before and after the perturbation of
a new branch, respectively. We denote ∆γ = R(C′)− R(C)
as the change of the security factor γ. Then, we obtain the
following result.
Proposition 4.6: When perturbing one more branch, ∆γ
changes -1, 0 or 1.
Proof. Please see Appendix F.
That is, there are three possible changes of the security
factor γ when one more branch is perturbed: increasing 1,
remaining the same or decreasing 1 (i.e., ∆γ = 1, 0 or −1).
Thus, a natural question emerges that, whether the value of
∆γ will change with the susceptance perturbation magnitude.
Let kd = {id, jd} be the new branch whose susceptance bidjd
is perturbed to be λbidjd with λ > 0 and λ 6= 1. We define
λ as the perturbation ratio. Suppose Mqmtd is an index set
of q columns in H′ that form a submatrix Hq such that
R([H Hq]) = R([H H′]) = n + q. The rest columns in
H′ form a submatrix Hp, i.e., H′ = [Hq Hp]. We define
Mqmtd as a security set. Overall, there are three cases should
be considered for the impacts on ∆γ when perturbing one
more branch:
• Case 1: Neither bus id nor jd are contained in the security
set. That is, id /∈M
q
mtd and jd /∈ M
q
mtd;
• Case 2: Either bus id or jd is contained in the security
set. That is, id ∈M
q
mtd and jd /∈ M
q
mtd, or id /∈ M
q
mtd
and jd /∈M
q
mtd;
• Case 3: Both bus id and jd are contained in the security
set. That is, id ∈M
q
mtd and jd ∈ M
q
mtd.
For each case, we analyze the change of ∆γ by varying the
perturbation ratio λ. Since there are limits on the susceptance
perturbation [29], we assume λmin ≤ λ ≤ λmax. We find
that the magnitude of the susceptance perturbation almost does
not affect the change of the security factor. Especially, if the
security factor increases 1 (i.e., ∆γ = 1), this result remains
the same regardless of the perturbation magnitude. We present
the details of the analysis in the following.
Proposition 4.7: Under Case 1, if id /∈ M
q
mtd and jd /∈
Mqmtd, then ∆γ remains the same regardless of the change
of λ.
Proof. Please see Appendix G.
Proposition 4.7 implies that, under Case 1, the perturbation
magnitude does not affect the change of dim(As). Therefore,
if we find that the dimension of the stealthy attack space
dim(As) decreses 1 when we perturb a branch to a certain
value, then this result will not change if we perturb the branch
to the other values. That is, we can determine the value of
dim(As) by only testing one perturbation ratio under Case
1. Considering the other two cases, we obtain the following
result.
Proposition 4.8: Under Case 2 and Case 3, only if there
exists a value λ∗ (λmin ≤ λ∗ ≤ λmax, λ∗ 6= 1) and λ = λ∗,
we obtain ∆γ = −1.
Proof. Please see Appendix H.
Proposition 4.8 implies that, under Case 2 and Case 3,
only if there exists an unique perturbation ratio and the target-
perturbation branch is perturbed to that value, the dimension
of the stealthy attack space dim(As) increases 1. Based on
this result, if ∆γ = 0 when we perturb a target-perturbation
branch to a certain value, then this result almost remains the
same regardless of the perturbation magnitude. Further, we
obtain a result about the increase of the security factor.
Theorem 4.9: Under all cases, ∆γ = 1 for any λ > 0
(λ 6= 1) if and only if there exists λ = λ∗ (λ∗ 6= 1) such that
∆γ = 1.
Proof. Please see Appendix I.
Theorem 4.9 implies that if the security factor γ increases
1 when we perturb one more branch, then this result will not
be changed with the variation of the susceptance perturbation
magnitude. In other words, once we find that the dimension
of the stealthy attack space dim(As) decreases 1 in a trial,
then this result will not change in the other trials. Therefore,
we can determine the security factor γ using only one tested
perturbation ratio when ∆γ = 1.
In summary, the susceptance perturbation magnitude almost
does not affect the change of the dimension of the stealthy
attack space dim(As) when one more branch is perturbed.
Thus, we can determine the dimension of the stealthy attack
space after we have perturbed the branches to certain ratios,
without worrying about the impact of the perturbation magni-
tude, especially the case when ∆γ = 1. Note that this is very
useful for the selection of the target-perturbation branches. We
present details about this issue in the next subsection.
8D. Guidance on the construction of an effective MTD
In this section, we first consider the optimal selection of
the set of target-perturbation branches. Then, we discuss the
increasing generation cost caused by MTD.
1) Target-perturbation branch selection: Here we propose
an algorithm for maximizing the security factor γ (i.e., min-
imizing the dimension of the stealthy attack space As) and
covering the largest number of buses, with a given number of
D-FACTS devices. We briefly introduce the algorithm in the
following.
Algorithm 1: Minimizing the dimension of the stealthy
attack space
Data: The number of D-FACTS devices nd; The set of
branches that can be perturbed Lp
1 Initialization: randomly rearrange Lp as
Lp = {k′1, k
′
2, · · · , k
′
p}, r = 0, r
′ = 0;
2 for each k′t ∈ Lp do
3 Perturb k′t to a random ratio λ;
4 if r = nd then
5 break ;
6 end
7 Compute ∆γ = R([H H′′])−R([H H′]) ;
8 if ∆γ = 1 then
9 put k′t in the branch set L
1
d;
10 r = r + 1;
11 end
12 end
13 if r < nd then
14 Enter Algorithm 2;
15 Ld = L1d ∪ L
2
d ;
16 else
17 Ld = L1d ;
18 end
Result: The set of target-perturbation branches Ld
For the sake of power transfer quantity and quality, the
branch parameters of some branches cannot be perturbed.
Therefore, the set of candidate branches input to Algorithm
1 may not be the set of all branches in the power network.
Thus, we only need to seek for an optimal deployment strategy
in the set of branches that can be perturbed. With the loop
(form line 2 to line 12) in Algorithm 1, we traverse all
perturbable branches until we obtain the maximum γ. This
process computes a set of target-perturbation branches that can
minimize the stealthy attack space. In the loop, we determine
whether the branch should be selected or not from line 8 to
line 11. Once ∆γ = 1, the branch is selected as a target-
perturbation branch; otherwise, it is not. When the iterations
in Algorithm 1 have finished, we determine whether we should
go into Algorithm 2 with the condition given in line 13. That
is, if γ is maximized and all the D-FACTS devices have been
used, then the algorithm is closed and the output L1d is the
set of target-perturbation branches. If γ is maximized but
there still exist unused D-FACTS devices, the algorithm enters
Algorithm 2 for maximizing the covered buses.
Algorithm 2 starts with the rest candidate branches except
those have been selected for maximizing γ. It incrementally
searches for branches that cover new buses. The target-
perturbation branch is selected according to the following
process. First of all, we select the branches that cover two
new buses (line 7 to line 10). Then, if there still exist unused
D-FACTS devices, we select the branches that cover one new
bus (line 16 and line 17). At last, if there still exist unused D-
FACTS devices, we select the branches from the rest candidate
branches (line 19 to line 21).
Algorithm 2: Covering the largest number of buses
1 Compute: L′p = Lp \ L
1
d; the set of buses I covered by
branches in L1d;
2 for each k′′t = {i
′′
t , j
′′
t } ∈ L
′
p do
3 if r + r′ = nd then
4 break ;
5 end
6 if i′′t or j
′′
t /∈ I then
7 if i′′t and j
′′
t /∈ I then
8 put k′′t in the branch set L
2
d ;
9 r′ = r′ + 1 ;
10 else
11 put k′′t in the branch set L
3
d ;
12 end
13 end
14 end
15 if r + r′ < nd then
16 if nd − r − r′ ≤| L3d | then
17 Select nd − r − r′ branches from L3d and put
them into the branch set L2d;
18 else
19 Put all branches in L3d into L
2
d;
20 Select nd − r − r′− | L3d | branches from L
′
p \ L
2
d
and put them into L2d;
21 end
22 end
23 Return L2d ;
The computation time requirement for the rank operation
of ∆γ = R([H H′′]) − R([H H′]) is O(mn2), where m is
the number of measurements and n is the number of buses
in the power network. The runtime for Algorithm 2 is O(l),
where l is the number of branches in the power network.
Considering the worst case that the rank operation would be
executed l times in the loop, the time complexity for Algorithm
1 is O(lmn2). Note that Algorithm 2 is not executed if the
condition given in line 13 of Algorithm 1 is not satisfied. In
fact, the above algorithm only outputs an alternative set of
target-perturbation branches. There may be a lot of candidates
that are also satisfied (see Section V-C1). Therefore, we can
dynamically change the perturbed branches and maintain the
effectiveness of MTD. On the other hand, we can realize MTD
on the basis of already deployed D-FACTS devices for saving
the additional infrastructure cost.
2) Reducing the operation cost: After determining the set
of branches that should be perturbed, a following problem
that we should consider is to reduce the operation cost by
appropriately setting their perturbation magnitudes. Optimal
power flow (OPF) seeks to optimize the operation of an electric
power system subject to the physical constraints imposed by
electrical laws and engineering limits [51]. It outputs the
minimum generation cost for the given loads by adjusting the
power flows. This generation cost can represent the operation
cost caused by the system changes of MTD. Here, OPF is
9stated as follows:
min
p
g
i
,i∈G
∑
i∈G
Ci(p
g
i )
s.t. pgi − p
l
i = Bθ, i ∈ N
pmini ≤ p
g
i ≤ p
max
i , i ∈ G
fminij ≤ fij ≤ f
max
ij , {i, j} ∈ L
λminij ≤ λij ≤ λ
max
ij , {i, j} ∈ L
(16)
where Ci(p
g
i ) is the cost function, G is the set of generators,
pgi is the real output power, p
l
i is the load, fij is the branch
active power flow, λij is the susceptance perturbation ratio.
In the above optimization problem, the decision variable is
the output generation level of each generator, and the cost
function is a quadratic function. The first constraint is about
the nodal power balance constraint, i.e., the power injections
must be equal to the power consumptions. The second and
third constraints are about the limits about the output gener-
ation and branch active power flow, respectively. The fourth
constraint is newly added here for the limits of the susceptance
perturbation. We can see that the matrix B contained in the
first constraint contains the branch perturbation parameters.
Therefore, this optimization problem is correlated with the
branch perturbation magnitude. Since the objective function is
convex and the constraints are differentiable, the OPF problem
is a typically convex optimization problem [32] [52], which
can be solved by the non-linear programming solver fmincon
in MATLAB.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate our findings about MTD using
an illustrative IEEE 14-bus power system (Fig. 5) and the
IEEE 30-bus, 57-bus, 118-bus and 145-bus power systems. All
simulations are based on the fully measured power system and
carried out in MATLAB. We assume that all meters are subject
to the same noise distribution, namely the Normal distribution
N (0, σ2), if the measurement noises are considered. The
threshold τ (see Section II-A) is set as σ
√
χ2m−n,α [32], where
m − n is the freedom degree of the Chi-square distribution
and α is the false alarm rate (which is 0.05). In practice,
each branch susceptance must be within given limits, namely
bminij ≤ bij ≤ b
max
ij [25]. The authors in [23] have proved
that if the perturbations are within 20% of the impedance,
then there are sufficiently large number of perturbation cases
that can restrict power losses within 1%. Thus, it is feasible to
perturb the branch susceptances within 20% maximum change.
In this paper, for the perturbation ratio λ, it is constrained to
be within [0.8, 1.2].
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Fig. 5: The IEEE 14-bus power system.
A. Effectiveness of MTD
1) The dimension of the stealthy attack space vs. branch
perturbations: Taking the IEEE 14-bus power system (Fig.
5) as an example, we analyze the dimension change of the
stealthy attack space (As) when we increase the number
of perturbed branches. We successively perturb the set of
branches as Ld1 = {k1}, L
d
2 = {k1, k2}, L
d
3 = {k1, k2, k3},
· · · . Fig. 6 shows the simulation results. We can see that
the dimension of the stealthy attack space decreases when
more branches are perturbed. But dim(As) cannot reach 0,
because the 14-bus power system only has 20 branches, which
is less than 2n = 26. Even though we perturb all branches,
the dimension of the stealthy attack space is 6, which is
the smallest stealthy attack space we can achieve in this 14-
bus power system. Consistent with the equation (14), the
smallest dimension of the stealthy attack space is equal to
2n− l = 2 ∗ 13− 20 = 6.
Moreover, we perturb all branches in the IEEE 30-bus, 57-
bus, 118-bus and 145-bus power systems. Table II shows the
smallest dimension of the stealthy attack space we obtain. We
also give the number of branches for each power system in
this table. We can see that all the smallest dimensions of the
stealthy attack space are not zero, which indicates that none of
the power systems support constructing complete MTD. Even
though the IEEE 145-bus power system has 453 branches,
which is larger than 2n = 288, the dimension of the stealthy
attack space is 10 after perturbing all its branches. In our
opinion, one reason for this result is that the IEEE 145-bus
power system contains 7 buses that are only connected by a
single branch. The simulation result indicates that is difficult
to meet the conditions required for achieving a complete MTD
in practice.
TABLE II: The dimension of As after perturbing all branches
IEEE test system 30-bus 57-bus 118-bus 145-bus
# branches 41 80 186 453
dim(As) 18 31 40 10
2) MTD’s effectiveness for thwarting FDI attacks: Next, we
exploit MTD’s effectiveness for thwarting FDI attacks with
respect to the dimension of the stealthy attack space. The
attack vector is constructed with the form of a = Hc, whereH
is a measurement matrix before MTD. We sample the value of
the element ci in c from a uniform distribution U(−dm, dm),
where dm is the maximum magnitude of the injected bias
into the state variable. Here dm is 0.1. The modified state
variables are uniformly selected from the bus set, i.e., the
non-zero elements in c are uniformly selected. We assume
that all branches in the power system can be perturbed, and the
measurements are noiseless. The perturbation ratio is randomly
chosen within [0.8, 1.2]. For each setting, we repeat random
attacks for 1000 times based on Monte Carlo simulations, and
estimate the detection probability of the FDI attack constructed
with H as
Pr =
# of detected trials
1000
, (17)
where # of detected trials means the number of FDI attack
vectors detected by the BDD after MTD. For consistency, we
use the metric
dim(As)
n
to measure the change of the dimension
of the stealthy attack space. Note that for a fixed dimension of
the stealthy attack space, there are several branch-perturbation
schemes for realizing MTD.
We use the IEEE 14-bus, 30-bus and 57-bus power systems
with default settings and data in MATPOWER. Fig. 7 shows
the simulation results. We can see that if the dimension of the
10
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Fig. 6: The dimension change of the
stealthy attack space As with respect to
the perturbed branches.
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Fig. 7: The detection probability of FDI
attacks with respect to the dimension of
the stealthy attack space.
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Fig. 8: The detection probability of FDI
attacks when only 3 state variables can
be modified by the attacker.
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Fig. 9: The detection probability of
FDI attacks when the dimension of the
stealthy attack space is fixed.
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Fig. 10: The detection probability of FDI
attacks with ci 6= 0 for i ∈ Mmtd (A1)
and ci = 0 for all i ∈Mmtd (A2).
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Fig. 11: The detection probability of FDI
attacks vs. different sets of perturbed
branches with only bus 8 is attacked.
stealthy attack space is smaller, the detection probability of
FDI attacks is larger. For example, in the 14-bus power system,
the detection probability of FDI is more than 90% when
dim(As)
n
is reduced to 0.6. Moreover, we find that if the system
size is larger, the curve is more smooth and the detection
probability of FDI attacks is larger given the same
dim(As)
n
.
The simulation results highlight that the smaller the dimension
of the stealthy attack space is, the better performance the MTD
achieves in terms of thwarting FDI attacks.
Besides, we consider the case when the attacker has limited
resources to modify state variables. We take the IEEE 14-bus
power system as an example. First, we assume that the attacker
can only modify 3 state variables, that is, there are only 3 non-
zero elements in c. We analyze the change of the detection
probability of FDI attacks with respect to the dimension of
the stealthy attack space. For each setting, we repeat random
attacks for 1000 times based on Monte Carlo simulations. That
is, for each time, the attacked state variables and the attack
vector are randomly generated. Fig. 8 shows the simulation
result. We can see that the detection probability increases with
dim(As)
n
. Again, it proves that a smaller stealthy attacks space
is more effective to thwart FDI attacks. Second, we assume
that the dimension of the stealthy attack space is fixed as 10,
while the number of modified state variables is varied. Note
that there are several combinations for a specific number of
state variables. For each setting, we repeat the simulation for
1000 times and uniformly select a set of state variables for
each time. The simulation result is plotted in Fig. 9. We can
see that the detection probability of FDI attacks increases with
the number of modified state variables. This indicates that the
attacker is more ambitious, the MTD is more effective.
Moreover, we investigate the impact of FDI attacks con-
structed with the former measurement matrix on the buses that
are not covered by the perturbed branches. We select k1, k3, k4
and k7 as the target-perturbation branches. They are perturbed
to the same ratio during simulations. The perturbation ratios
are set within [1.02, 1.2] spaced by 0.02. The attack vector
a = Hc is constructed by considering two cases: ci 6= 0 for
i ∈ Mmtd and ci = 0 for all i ∈ Mmtd, where Mmtd is a
set of buses that are covered by the perturbed branches. We
denote these two cases as “A1” and “A2,” respectively. The
measurement noise is fixed as σ2 = 0.01. For each setting,
we repeat the simulation for 1000 times. For each time, we
uniformly selected the non-zero elements in c. The simulation
results are given in Fig. 10. We can see that, for case A1,
the detection probability of the FDI attack is more than 84%
when the measurements are noiseless. We believe that this
large detection probabilities is because a /∈ S(H′) holds for
most cases. When the measurements are noisy in case A1,
the detection probability of FDI attacks is disturbed by the
noise. But it is still more than 60% and increases with the
perturbation ratio. For case A2, we can see that, whether the
measurements are noisy or not, the detection probability of
FDI attacks is almost negligible. This indicates that the buses
that are not covered by the perturbed branches are vulnerable
to FDI attacks. Therefore, to improve the effectiveness of
MTD, the perturbed branches should cover as many buses as
possible.
3) Impact of the bus that is only connected by a single
branch: Next, we consider the attack on the bus that is only
connected by a single branch. Here we validate our finding
using the IEEE 14-bus power system. We find that bus 8 is
only connected by branch {7, 8}. First, we only inject errors
into the state variable of bus 8. We test this attack for 10
trials. For each trial, we select 1000 sets of perturbed branches
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Fig. 12: The attacks on bus 8 can always bypass the BDD
after MTD in the IEEE 14-bus power system.
except for branch {7, 8} randomly. The noise variance is fixed
as 0.01. Fig. 11 shows the simulation results. We can see that
the attacks on bus 8 can always bypass the BDD after MTD
when the measurements are noiseless. And for the noisy case,
the detection probability of this attack is almost negligible
(around 0.05). By contrast, we conduct another 13 trials but
focus on attacking different buses. For the ith trial, we only
modify the state variable of bus i. In these trials, we perturb
all branch susceptances. Fig. 12 shows the simulation results.
We can see that, no matter the measurements are noiseless or
noisy, we have a negligible detection probability of the FDI
attack when the state variable of bus 8 is modified. But it can
be detected when we attack the other buses. The above results
highlight the weakness of the bus that is only connected by a
single branch and prove that we can never achieve a complete
MTD when the power network contains such a bus.
Next, we consider the induced generation cost when at-
tacking the bus that is only connected by a single branch.
Considering the IEEE 30-bus power system, there are 3 buses
that are only connected by a single branch. And one of them
is a load bus (bus 26). In the following, we exploit the
increasing generation cost when the attacker compromises this
load bus. The objective function is linear with the value of
generation, i.e., Ci(p
g
i ) = µip
g
i [see the OPF problem (16)].
The parameters about the generators are shown in Table III.
And all active power flows are limited to 500 MW. In this case,
we perturb all branches with the perturbation ratios sampled
within [0.8, 1.2]. The default setting and load data provided
in MATPOWER are used. First, we use fmincon in MATLAB
to compute an optimal generation dispatch result. Then, the
measurements associated with bus 26 are corrupted. It results
in deceiving the amount of the load on bus 26 transmitted to
the control center for solving the OPF problem. The simulation
results are shown in Table IV. L0 is the original load at bus 26.
We can see the generation cost increases with the corrupted
load. Actually, the load attack may also lead the system to
a non-optimal generation dispatch, and the worst, may cause
load shedding [53].
TABLE III: Parameters of the generators
Generation bus 1 2 13 22 23 27
P gmax 100 100 100 100 100 100
µi($/MWh) 20 30 20 20 30 20
B. Impact of the susceptance perturbation magnitude on the
dimension of the stealthy attack space
To demonstrate the results given in Section IV-C, we
analyze the dimension change of the stealthy attack space
TABLE IV: Increasing in generation cost when the load bus
that is only connected by a single branch is attacked
Communicated load L0 1.2L0 1.4L0 1.6L0 1.8L0 2.0L0
Generation cost (103$/h) 3.784 3.798 3.812 3.826 3.840 3.854
Increasing rate 0 0.37% 0.74% 1.11% 1.48% 1.85%
by varying the perturbation ratio. We give six examples for
the three cases stated in Section IV-C with the IEEE 14-
bus power system. For each example, we randomly choose
10000 perturbation ratios within [0.8, 1.2]. At the beginning,
we choose an initial set of perturbed branches. Then, we
perturb one more branch kd. Let dim(As) and dim∗(As)
denote the dimension of the stealthy attack space before and
after this perturbation, respectively. During simulations, we
count the number of exceptions when dim∗(As) is changed.
The simulation results are shown in Table V. We can see that
if the dimension of the stealthy attack space is reduced by
1, then this result always holds for all perturbation ratios in
these three cases. If the dimension of the stealthy attack space
remains the same after the perturbation of branch kd, we do not
find exceptions in the first (case 1) and third (case 2) example,
i.e., this result always holds regardless of the perturbation ratio.
But in the fifth (case 3) example, we find the dimension of the
stealthy attack space increases 1 when we set the perturbation
ratio to be 0.88. In other words, dim(As) = dim
∗(As)
does not always hold in case 3. Moreover, we find that this
exception happens when the perturbation ratio of branch k6
is the same with that of branch k3. Therefore, in order to
avoid the change of stealthy attack space’s dimension with the
perturbation magnitude, we should not perturb the branches to
the same ratio.
TABLE V: Impact of the perturbation magnitude on the
dimension of the stealthy attack space
Cases Initial set kd dim
∗(As)− dim(As) # Exceptions
Case 1
{k1, k2, k3, k4} k14 0 0
{k1, k2, k3, k4} k16 -1 0
Case 2
{k1, k2, k3, k4} k5 0 0
{k5, k6, k8} k1 -1 0
Case 3
{k1, k2, k3, k4} k6 0 1
{k1, k6} k4 -1 0
C. Guidance on constructing an effective MTD
1) Target-perturbation branch selection:
Evaluation of our algorithm. First, with the IEEE 14-
bus power system, we evaluate the selection of the set of
target-perturbation branches with Algorithm 1 and Algorithm
2. A total number of 10 D-FACTS devices are given for
constructing/realizing MTD. We assume that all branches in
this power system can be perturbed. With the aim to minimize
the dimension of the stealthy attack space and maximize
the number of covered buses, we adopt Algorithm 1 and
2 in Section IV-D1. From Algorithm 1, we obtain a set
of target-perturbation branches as {k1, k3, k4, k7, k8, k11, k12}.
From Algorithm 2, we obtain a set of target-perturbation
branches as {k16, k17, k20}. We get the final set of the target-
perturbation branches by combining these two sets. With this
MTD, the dimension of the stealthy attack space is 6 and
the number of covered buses is 13. The target-perturbation
branches deployed with D-FACTS devices are shown in Fig.
13(a). For comparison, if we optionally perturb the set of
branches {k1, k2, k3, k4, k5, k6, k7, k8, k9, k10} (Fig. 13(b)),
the dimension of stealthy attack space is 8 and the number
12
of the covered buses is 8. This indicates that the output from
our algorithm is better than the optional selections.
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Fig. 13: Comparison of the optimal deployment of D-FACTS
devices using our algorithm and the optionally selected target-
perturbation branches. (a) Output from the Algorithms given
in Section IV-D1; (b) Optionally selected target-perturbation
branches. In the first case, dim(As) = 6 and the number of
covered buses is 13; while in the second case, dim(As) = 8
and the number of covered buses is 8.
In fact, if we start Algorithm 1 from different branches, we
can obtain different sets of target-perturbation branches. We
take the IEEE 14-bus power system as an example. Suppose
that there are 9 D-FACTS devices for constructing MTD, and
all branches in this 14-bus power system can be perturbed.
We start Algorithm 1 from branch k2 and k16, respectively.
Correspondingly, we obtain the sets of target-perturbation
branches as Lfrom k2d = {k2, k3, k7, k9, k10, k11, k15, k16, k19}
and Lfrom k16d = {k2, k4, k6, k8, k10, k11, k16, k19, k20}, re-
spectively. We can see that the sets of target-perturbation
branches are different when we start Algorithm 1 from branch
k2 and k16. But we find that the values of γ and the number
of covered buses are the same, i.e., γ = 7 and the number
of covered buses is 13. This indicates that, even though the
sets of target-perturbation branches output from our algorithm
are different with different start points, they result in the same
dimension of stealthy attack space and the same number of
covered buses. Thus, we can dynamically change the perturbed
branches and maintain the effectiveness of MTD. On the other
hand, we can select the branches that are already deployed
with D-FACTS devices for realizing MTD, which can help
reducing the infrastructure cost.
Computation time of the algorithm. Moreover, we eval-
uate the computation time of the algorithm for the selection
of target-perturbation branches. Note that Algorithm 2 is not
executed if the condition given in line 13 of Algorithm 1 is not
satisfied. We run the algorithm in a core i7 laptop, which has a
2.4GHz CPU and 8.0G memory. We assume that all branches
can be perturbed in the adopted power systems. First, we use
the IEEE 14-bus power system as an example. We vary the
number of perturbed branches from 1 to 20. The computation
time of our algorithm is shown in Fig. 14. We can see that
the computation time is less than 10ms when the number of
D-FACTS devices is less than 8, while it is more than 30ms
when the number of D-FACTS devices is larger than 8. It
seems that the computation time increases 3 times when the
number of D-FACTS devices increases from 8 to 9. This is
because only Algorithm 1 is executed when the number of
D-FACTS devices is less than 8, i.e., the condition in line
13 of Algorithm 1 is not satisfied. While both Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 2 are executed when the number of D-FACTS
devices is larger than 8. This indicates that sometimes it takes
longer for executing Algorithm 2.
Second, we change the size of the power system while
fix the number of D-FACTS devices as 10. Here we adopt
the IEEE 14-bus, 30-bus, 57-bus, 118-bus and 145-bus power
systems. The computation time of our algorithm is given in
Fig. 15. We can see that the computation time increases from
around 30ms (14-bus) to more than 300ms (145-bus), which
indicates that the computation time of our algorithm increases
with the system size. Moreover, we find that the computation
time with the 14-bus power system is a little larger than that
with the 30-bus power system. In our opinion, the reason
is that, given 10 D-FACTS devices, both Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2 are executed with the 14-bus power system, while
only the Algorithm 1 is executed with the 30-bus, 57-bus, 118-
bus and 145-bus power systems. Overall, we can efficiently
compute the result (within 350ms in all given power systems).
2) Reducing the operation cost: Furthermore, we evalu-
ate the impact of the perturbed branch and the susceptance
perturbation magnitude on the increasing of the operation
cost. For the OPF problem, we use the objective function as
Ci(p
g
i ) = µip
g
i , which is a linear generation cost model. With
the IEEE 14-bus power system, the generators are installed at
bus 1, 2, 3, 6 and 8, and their parameters are shown in Table
VI. The active power flow limits of branch 1 is 160 MW
and the other active power flows are limited to 60 MW. We
assume that the optimal results are obtained at the beginning.
Then, we analyze the increase of the generation cost when
we perturb branch k2 and k4 to different ratios, respectively.
The simulation results are plotted in Fig. 16. We can see
that the increasing of the generation cost under these two
cases are different. When the branch susceptance is decreased,
the increasing of generation cost by perturbing k4 is slightly
lower than that of by perturbing k2. But the generation cost
increases as the perturbation ratio decreases in both cases.
When the branch susceptance is increased, the generation cost
of perturbing k4 almost remains invariant, while it increases
with the perturbation ratio by perturbing k2. The simulation
result indicates that, by appropriately selecting the perturbed
branch and the perturbation magnitude, we can reduce the
increasing operation cost of MTD.
TABLE VI: Parameters of the generators
Generation bus 1 2 3 6 8
P gmax 300 50 30 50 20
µi($/MWh) 20 30 40 50 35
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, with the DC power flow model, we analyzed
the completeness, deployment and the increasing operation
cost of MTD in terms of thwarting stealthy FDI attacks
constructed with old system information. To begin with, we
proved that an MTD is complete to defeat all FDI attacks
constructed with former branch parameters only if the number
of branches l is larger than or equal to twice that of the
system states n (i.e., l ≥ 2n, where n + 1 is the number of
system buses), and the susceptances of more than n branches,
which cover all buses, are perturbed. Besides, we prove that we
can never realize a complete MTD if the power transmission
system has a bus that is only connected by a single branch.
Further, we prove that the susceptance perturbation magnitude
almost does not affect the dimension of the stealthy attack
space after MTD. Based on this result, we presented guidance
on effective MTD for minimizing the dimension of the stealthy
stealthy attack space, maximizing the number of covered buese
and reducing the operation cost. Finally, we illustrated and
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demonstrated our findings with the IEEE standard test power
systems.
APPENDIX A
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Since Hu can be linearly
represented by H′, we have Hucu ∈ S(H′) for any cu ∈ Ru.
Suppose cv = 0v. Then, we have a = H
ucu+H
vcv ∈ S(H′)
(i.e., a ∈ As), which means that we cannot detect this FDI
attack. Therefore, we must have cv 6= 0v for detecting the
attack vector a.
APPENDIX B
Proof of Proposition 4.2. (Sufficiency) Since γ =
R([HH′]) = 2n, we have dim(As) = dim(S(H)∩S(H′)) =
0. It follows that AS = {0}. Therefore, the MTD is complete.
(Necessity) Since the MTD is complete, we have As =
{0}. It follows that dim(As) = dim(S(H)∩ S(H′)) = 2n−
R([H H′]) = 0. Thus, we have γ = R([H H′]) = 2n.
APPENDIX C
Proof of Theorem 4.3. Considering the first condition,
we resort to a contradiction. That is, suppose that the MTD is
complete but l < 2n. Let Ĥ and Ĥ′ denote the measurement
matrices before and after MTD with a fully measured power
system, respectively. Thus, with any partially measured power
system, the measurement matrix H is formed by selecting
some rows from Ĥ. Therefore, the combined matrix [H H′]
can be formed by selecting some rows from the combined
matrix [Ĥ Ĥ′]. It follows that R([H H′]) ≤ R([Ĥ Ĥ′]). We
have proved that R([Ĥ Ĥ′]) = 2n only if the number of
branches l is greater than or equal to 2n. Therefore, we can
derive that R([H H′]) ≤ R([Ĥ Ĥ′]) < 2n if l < 2n. This
indicates that the MTD is not complete, which contradicts to
the original assumption. Therefore, we must guarantee l ≥ 2n
for achieving a complete MTD.
Next, we consider the second condition. Let Mmtd be the
set of buses covered by the perturbed branches and ns is
the size of Mmtd. Hq is a submatrix formed by selecting
q columns from H′ such that the combined matrix [H Hq]
has full column rank. Let Mqmtd be an index set of these q
columns in H′. SinceMqmtd ⊆Mmtd, we have q ≤ ns. If the
MTD is complete, then we have q = n. Therefore, ns ≥ n,
that is, the perturbed branches must cover all buses.
APPENDIX D
Proof of Theorem 4.4. Suppose t is the bus that is only
connected by a single branch. And the susceptance of the
connected branch k = {t′, t} is bt′t. Let ei ∈ {0, 1}n be
a vector with a unit in the ith position and zero elsewhere,
and let uij = ei − ej (k = {i, j} ∈ L) be a vector with
“1” in the ith position and “-1” in the jth position and
zero elsewhere. Considering the fully measured case, let the
tth column of the branch-bus shift factor matrix S and the
symmetric admittance matrix B be st and bt, respectively.
Then, we have st = −bt′tet and bt = bt′tut′t. Suppose
s′t = −b
′
t′tet and b
′
t = b
′
t′tut′t after MTD. Then, we can
derive that st =
bt′t
b′
t′t
s′t and bt =
bt′t
b′
t′t
b′t. Let ht and h
′
t be the
tth column of H and H′ before and after MTD, respectively.
Then, we have ht =
bt′t
b′
t′t
h′t. Since any H can be formed by
selecting some rows from the measurement matrix under the
fully measured case, we can derive ht =
bt′t
b′
t′t
h′t under the
partially measured case as well. It follows that S(H′) = S(H)
if we only perturb the branch k. Therefore, we can never obtain
γ = R([H H′]) = 2n.
APPENDIX E
Proof of Proposition 4.5. Let ei ∈ {0, 1}n be a vector
with a unit in the ith position and zeros elsewhere, and let
uij = ei − ej (k = {i, j} ∈ L) be a vector with “1” in the
ith position and “-1” in the jth position and zeros elsewhere.
Then, we can rewrite A and D as
A =
∑
k∈L
k={i,j}
eku
T
ij , D =
∑
k∈L
k={i,j}
−bijeke
T
k . (18)
Supposing the diagonal branch susceptance matrix after
MTD is D′ and ∆D = D′ − D, then we can derive ∆D
as
∆D =
∑
kd∈LD
kd={id,jd}
−(b′idjd − bidjd)ekde
T
kd
=
∑
kd∈LD
kd={id,jd}
−∆bidjdekde
T
kd
.
(19)
We can see that there are non-zero elements in positions
(kd, kd) with kd ∈ LD and zeros elsewhere in ∆D. Since
14
eTi ej = 0 if i 6= j and e
T
i ej = 1 if i = j, we can derive that
the change of the branch-bus shift factor matrix is
∆S = ∆DA =
∑
kd∈LD
kd={id,jd}
−(∆bidjdekde
T
kd
)
(
ekdu
T
idjd
)
=
∑
kd∈LD
kd={id,jd}
−∆bidjdekdu
T
idjd
(20)
We can observe that ∆S is a sparse matrix with the kdth row
is non-zero and other rows are all zero. That is, if i ∈ LD,
then the ith row of ∆S is ∆Si = [· · ·−∆bidjd · · ·∆bidjd · · · ]
with −∆bidjd in the ith column and ∆bidjd in the jth column;
if i /∈ LD, ∆Si = [0 · · · 0 · · · 0]. Similarly, since B = ATS,
we have ∆B = AT∆S
∆B = AT∆S =
∑
kd∈LD
kd={id,jd}
−∆bidjd(uidjde
T
kd
)
(
ekdu
T
idjd
)
=
∑
kd∈LD
kd={id,jd}
−∆bidjduidjdu
T
idjd
.
(21)
∆B is a sparse matrix with the idth and jdth columns are
non-zero and the other columns are all zero.
On the basis of the measurement matrix H (before MTD)
andH′ (after MTD). SinceH′ = [B+∆B;S+∆S;−S−∆S],
we can derive that the difference of the measurement matrix
is
∆H = H′ −H =


∆B
∆S
−∆S

 . (22)
Obviously, we can see that ∆H is a sparse matrix with
non-zero elements in the idth and jdth column with kd =
{id, jd} ∈ LD.
For example, if we only perturb a single branch, that is,
Ld = {kd} with kd = {id, jd}, then ∆H under a fully
measured case is stated as
∆H =


0
... 0
... 0
· · · −∆bidjd · · · ∆bidjd · · · }id
0
... 0
... 0
· · · ∆bidjd · · · −∆bidjd · · · }jd
0
... 0
... 0
· · · −∆bidjd · · · ∆bidjd · · · }n+ kd
0
... 0
... 0
· · · ∆bidjd · · · −∆bidjd · · · }n+ l + kd
0
... 0
... 0︸︷︷︸
id
︸︷︷︸
jd


,
(23)
where ∆bidjd is the susceptance perturbation of branch kd, 0
is a zero matrix/vector. We can see that all non-zero elements
in ∆H are in the idth column and the jdth column. Since any
measurement matrix is formed by selecting some rows from
the measurement matrix H under the fully measured case,
we can derive that ∆H is also a sparse matrix with non-zero
elements in the idth and jdth column with kd = {id, jd} ∈
LD .
APPENDIX F
Proof of Proposition 4.6. We have C′ = [H H′] +
[0m×n ∆H] = C+ [0m×n ∆H], where 0m×n is an m by n
zero matrix, ∆H is a matrix corresponding to the susceptance
perturbation of the new branch. According to the equation
(23), R(∆H) = 1 when one more branch is perturbed. Since
R(C′) ≤ R(C) + R(∆H), we have R(C′) ≤ R(C) + 1.
Conversely, we have C = [H H′] + [0m×n − ∆H] =
C′ + [0m×n − ∆H]. Thus, we can derive that R(C) ≤
R(C′) + R(−∆H) ⇒ R(C′) ≥ R(C) − 1. Therefore, we
have R(C)− 1 ≤ R(C′) ≤ R(C) + 1.
APPENDIX G
Proof of Proposition 4.7. Here we only analyze the case
when id /∈ M
q
mtd, because we can draw a same conclusion
when jd /∈ M
q
mtd. We denote det(·) as the determinant of
a matrix. ai is the ith column of a matrix A. Since id /∈
Mqmtd and jd /∈ M
q
mtd, the idth column h
′
id
and the jdth
column h′jd of H
′ can be linearly represented by the columns
in [H Hq]. It follows that R([H Hq h′id ]) = R([H H
q]) =
R([H H′]). After the susceptance perturbation of branch kd,
h′id and h
′
jd
respectively become h′′id and h
′′
jd
according to the
proof of Proposition 4.5. We rearrange the matrix C′ as C′ =
[H Hq h′′id h
′′
jd
H′′r ], where H
′′
r is a submatrix containing the
columns in Hp (H′ = [Hq Hp]) that are not changed after the
perturbation of branch kd. Let C
′′ = [H Hq h′id h
′′
id
h′′jd H
′′
r ]
be a matrix by filling the column h′id into C
′. Then, we can
derive that R(C′′) = R(C′).
We calculate R(C′′) through elementary column operations.
Since only the element relating to branch kd is changed in
column h′′id , by subtracting h
′′
id
from h′id , we have ∆h
′′
id
=
h′′id − h
′
id
= [0 · · · 0 ± (λ − 1)bidjd 0 · · · 0 ± (λ −
1)bidjd 0 · · · 0]
T , where (λ− 1)bidjd and −(λ− 1)bidjd are
the only non-zero elements in the vector ∆h′′id . The number
of non-zero elements in this column depends on the measured
case of the power system. But it is less than 4 according to
the example given in the equation (23). For the elementary
column operation, we transfer the column h′id to ∆h
′′
id
in
C′′. Since the other elements of the column ∆h′′id are zero,
any other column operations on this column are only related
to (λ − 1)bidjd . Therefore, it is equivalent to operate on
(λ − 1)bidjd for elementary column operations for any λ if
λ 6= 1. For example, we perturb the susceptance of branch
kd to λ1bidjd and λ2bidjd , respectively. Assume that only
the branches are monitored by meters and each branch is
monitored by one meter. Then, we can derive that
∆h′′id =[0 · · · 0 (1− λ)bidjd 0 · · · 0]
T,︸︷︷︸
kdth element
(24)
If the required column operation is to multiply ∆h′′id with
a constant η, then the result is h = η∆h′′id . We find h =
η[0 · · · 0 (1 − λ1)bidjd 0 · · · 0]
T = η × λ1
λ2
[0 · · · 0 (1 −
λ2)bidjd 0 · · · 0]
T. That is, we can always obtain the same
column operation result h regardless of the value of λ.
Therefore, the impact of ∆h′′id on R(C
′′) is not related to
the value of λ. Thus, the impact of the column h′′id on R(C
′′)
is not related to the value of λ. Since R(C′′) = R(C′), the
impact of the column h′′id on R(C
′) is not related to the
value of λ. As for the column h′′jd , we can draw the same
conclusion by using elementary column operations. Therefore,
∆γ = R(C′) − R(C) does not change with λ (λ > 0 and
λ 6= 1).
15
APPENDIX H
Proof of Proposition 4.8 . We prove this proposition in
Case 2 and Case 3, respectively. We denote det(·) as the
determinant of a matrix. ai is the ith column of a matrix A.
Case 2: id ∈M
q
mtd and jd /∈ M
q
mtd
Since ∆γ = −1, we have R([H H′′]) = R([H H′])− 1. It
follows that we must have R([H Hqr h
′′
id
]) = R([H Hq])− 1
when λ = λ∗, where Hqr is a submatrix formed by deleting
the column h′id from H
q, h′id is the idth column of H
′, h′′id
is the idth column of H
′′ after the perturbation of branch kd.
If we select any n + q rows that contain the perturbed rows
(i.e., there are elements λbidjd and/or −λbidjd in this row) and
any n+ q columns from the combined matrix [H Hqr h
′′
id
], we
can form an n + q by n + q square matrix Q. Using the
Leibniz formula, det(Q) is a linear function of λbidjd , that is,
det(Q) = abidjdλ+ b, where a and b are values calculated by
other elements. Specifically, a and b are different if we choose
different rows and columns to form Q. Because the combined
matrix [H Hqr h
′′
id
] has full column rank when λ = 1, there
exists Q such that det(Q) = abidjd + b 6= 0. Therefore, a
and b cannot be 0 at the same time. If a = 0, then det(Q) =
abidjdλ + b 6= 0 for any λ. Therefore, there does not exist λ
such that det(Q)= 0. If a 6= 0, then det(Q) = abidjdλ+b = 0
has an unique solution −b
abidjd
. As ∆γ = −1 when λ = λ∗,
we have R([H Hqr h
′′
id
]) = n + q − 1. It follows that, for
any Q, we have det(Q)= abidjdλ
∗ + b = 0. This indicates
that λ∗ must be equal to −b
abidjd
. Therefore, ∆γ = −1 only if
there exists λ∗ such that λmin ≤ λ∗ ≤ λmax and λ∗ 6= 1 and
λ = λ∗.
Case 3: id ∈M
q
mtd and jd ∈ M
q
mtd
After branch kd is perturbed, we can rearrange C
′ =
[H H′′] as C′ = [H Hqr h
′′
id
h′′jd H
p], where Hqr is a matrix
containing the rest columns of Hq that are not changed, h′′id
and h′′jd are the idth column and jdth column in H
′′ that
are perturbed. If we select any n + q rows that contain the
perturbed rows (i.e., there are elements λbidjd and/or −λbidjd
in this row) and any n+ q columns from the combined matrix
[H Hqr h
′′
id
h′′jd ], we can from an n + q by n + q square
matrix Q. Using the Leibniz formula, the determinant of Q
is det(Q) = abidjdλ + b, where a and b are coefficients
after the calculation. As there exists Q such that we have
det(Q) = abidjd + b 6= 0 when λ = 1, a and b cannot be
0 at the same time. Then, if a = 0, there exists Q such that
det(Q) 6= 0 for any λ. Therefore, ∆γ 6= −1 for any λ. If
a 6= 0, det(Q) = abidjdλ + b = 0 has an unique solution
−b
abidjd
. Thus, if R(Q) = n + q − 1 (i.e., ∆γ = −1) when
λ = λ∗, then λ∗ must be equal to −b
abidjd
. Therefore,∆γ = −1
only if there exists λ∗ such that λmin ≤ λ∗ ≤ λmax and
λ∗ 6= 1 and λ = λ∗.
APPENDIX I
Proof of Theorem 4.9.
Case 1: id /∈M
q
mtd and jd /∈ M
q
mtd
In Case 1, we have proved that the susceptance-perturbation
magnitude does not affect the change of security factor γ.
Therefore, if there exists λ = λ∗ such that ∆γ = 1, then this
result will not change if we change the perturbation magnitude
to the other values. The proof of necessity is obvious.
Case 2: id ∈M
q
mtd and jd /∈ M
q
mtd
(Sufficiency) Suppose there exists a column h
p
t in H
p such
that h
p
t cannot be linearly represented by the columns in
[H Hqr] when we perturb the susceptance of branch kd to
λ∗bidjd , where H
q
r is a submatrix formed by the columns
of Hq that are not changed after the perturbation. Since
R([H Hq]) = R([H H′]), we cannot find another two
columns in Hp that cannot be linearly represented by the
columns in [H Hqr]. Therefore, in order to have ∆γ =
R([H H′′]) − R([H H′]) = 1, at least one of h′′id and h
′′
jd
cannot be linearly represented by the columns in [H Hqr],
where h′′id and h
′′
jd
are respective the idth column and jdth
column in H′′ after the perturbation of branch kd. Here,
we suppose that h′′id cannot be linearly represented by the
columns in [H Hqr] (we can draw the same conclusion if h
′′
jd
cannot be linearly represented by the columns in [H Hqr]).
Let Q = [H Hqr h
p
t h
′′
id
] be a matrix of full column rank and
R(Q) = R(H H′′]) = R([H H′]) + 1. We select (n+ q+1)
rows that contain the perturbed rows (i.e., there are elements
λ∗bidjd and/or −λ
∗bidjd in this row) and (n+ q+1) columns
from Q to form an (n+ q + 1) by (n+ q + 1) square matrix
Q¯. Using the Leibniz formula, we can derive that det(Q¯) is
a linear function of λ∗bidjd , that is, det(Q¯) = abidjdλ
∗ + b,
where a and b are values after the calculation. Specifically, a
and b are different if we choose different rows and columns in
Q to form Q¯. Since ∆γ = 1, we can derive that there exists
Q¯ such that det(Q¯) = abidjdλ
∗ + b 6= 0. Therefore, a and b
cannot be 0 at the same time.
If a = 0, we have b 6= 0. Therefore, for any λ∗, we have
det(Q¯) = abidjdλ + b 6= 0. It follows that we always have
∆γ = 1 for λ > 0 (λ 6= 1). If a 6= 0, we exploit whether
or not there exists λ such that ∆γ < 1. If ∆γ < 1, we must
have R(Q) ≤ R([H H′]). It indicates that, for any Q¯, we
have det(Q¯) = 0. As we know, λ∗ = 1 is the unique solution
for det(Q¯) = abidjdλ
∗ + b = 0 (for any Q¯). However, since
λ∗ 6= 1, we can never have det(Q¯) = 0 for any Q¯. Therefore,
∆γ = 1 for any λ > 0 (λ 6= 1).
(Necessity) Obviously, if ∆γ = 1 for any λ > 0 (λ 6= 1),
that there must exists λ = λ∗ such that ∆γ = 1.
Case 3: id ∈M
q
mtd and jd ∈M
q
mtd
(Sufficiency) Let P = [H Hqr], where H
q
r is a submatrix
containing the columns in Hq that are not changed after
perturbing the susceptance of branch kd to λ
∗bidjd . Because
R([H Hq]) = R([H H′]) = n + q, we can never find
another three columns in Hp to form a combined matrix
with P that has rank n + q + 1. Therefore, supposing
R([H Hqr h
′′
t h
′′
t′ h
′′
t′′ ]) = n+ q+1, then at least one column
in h′′t , h
′′
t′ , h
′′
t′′ is either h
′′
id
or h′′jd , where h
′′
id
and h′′jd are
the columns being perturbed in Hq after the perturbation of
branch kd. Here we assume that is h
′′
id
(we can draw the
same conclusion if it is h′′jd ). Let Q = [H H
q
r h
′′
id
h′′t h
′′
t′ ].
It follows that R(Q) = n + q + 1. We select (n + q + 1)
rows that contain the perturbed rows (i.e., there are elements
λ∗bidjd and/or −λ
∗bidjd in this row) and (n+ q+1) columns
from Q to form an (n + q + 1) by (n + q + 1) square
matrix Q¯. Using the Leibniz formula, we can obtain that the
determinant of Q¯ is det(Q¯) = abidjdλ
∗ + b, where a and b
are coefficients after the calculation. Since there exists Q¯ such
that det(Q¯) = abidjdλ
∗ + b 6= 0, a and b cannot be 0 at the
same time.
If a = 0, we have b 6= 0. Thus, det(Q¯) 6= 0 for any λ∗ >
0. Therefore, ∆γ = 1 for any λ∗ > 0. If a 6= 0, as we
know, λ = 1 is the unique solution for det(Q¯) = abidjdλ
∗ +
b = 0. However, since λ∗ 6= 1, we can never have det(Q¯) =
abidjdλ
∗+b 6= 0 for any Q¯ and any λ > 0 (λ∗ 6= 1). Therefore,
∆γ = 1 for any λ > 0 (λ 6= 1).
(Necessity) Since ∆γ = 1 for any λ > 0 (λ 6= 1), we must
have λ = λ∗ such that ∆γ = 1.
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